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Abstract  
 
In this paper, we try to point out some important weaknesses of the contemporary 
French social-economic model, focusing on relevant elements of comparison with Nor-
dic countries. In doing so, we rely on the idea that large and small countries differ in 
terms of growth and governance strategies. Hence, while a look at the “Nordic model” 
can be a good way to reveal of some of France’s major problems, it is also an ambiguous 
template for reform. The paper starts by examining the question of growth strategy 
(macroeconomic management and structural reforms), then goes on to investigate gov-
ernance strategy (trust, confidence, governance quality) and finally explores the issues of 
diversity and integration policy.  
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« La vie forte est au nord. Là s’est opéré le grand mouvement des nations ». 
Jules Michelet, Tableau de la France. 
 
 
“I am but mad north-north-west, when the wind is southerly,  
and I know a hawk from a handsaw”  
Hamlet, II, ii.  
 
Prologue: Northern is beautiful? 
 
What is the state and future of the French social-economic “model”? If the state of mind 
of the French people is of any relevance to answering this question, one can look back at the 
arguments exchanged during the presidential campaign of 2006-2007 to grasp it. Two conflicting 
visions of France’s future were then developed by the main candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and 
Ségolène Royal. Yet, they resulted from two common diagnoses: first, the French model is deep-
ly ill, and not merely going through a bad phase; second, France can usefully take a look at the 
world to find inspiration for reform, studying and importing best practices from more successful 
nations. The candidate of the right expressed a marked preference for the notorious “Anglo-
Saxon” pattern, while the “Nordic model” was praised by the candidate of the left. Judging by 
the outcome of the election, it seems that the latter left a majority of French voters unconvinced.  
 
This could come as a surprise given the “Nordic mania” that has developed in France in 
recent years. Parliamentary reports, academic papers and press articles all seem to tell the same 
story: since France is so much attached to equality in a globalized world that has become a less 
hospitable place for it, the Nordic paradise, where openness, efficiency and equality coexist 
harmoniously, would be the French new frontier. But is it only a coincidence that there is no such 
thing as a large Nordic country?  
 
While Jules Michelet reminds us that the French Nordic obsession is nothing new, 
Shakespeare invites us to prudence when considering institutional “copy and paste”: it is always 
important to know hawks from herons. 
 
In this paper, we try to point out some important weaknesses of the contemporary 
French socioeconomic model, focusing on relevant elements of comparison with Nordic coun-
tries. In doing so, we rely on the idea that large and small countries differ in terms of growth 
and governance strategies. Hence, while a look at the Nordic model can be a good way to reveal 
some of France’s major problems, it is also an ambiguous template. The paper starts by examin-
ing the question of growth strategy (macroeconomic management and structural reforms), then 
goes on to investigate governance strategy (trust, confidence, governance quality), and finally 
explores the issues of diversity and integration policy. For every dimension we study and com-
pare, we try as much as possible to distinguish among France, continental countries and Nordic 
nations, in order to set apart continental and French issues. We start by an exposition of our 
basic line of reasoning regarding the relation between country size and social-economic policy. 
 
A. Large and small states, a basic elementary framework 
 
The relation between country size and economic policy was an essential feature of eco-
nomic theory until the end of the 1970s, before it gradually gave way to an a-geographic ap-
proach to macroeconomic performance of national models, often exclusively characterized by 
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their social compact. Actually, in the light of the last two decades of literature on economic 
policy, it seemed as if increasingly integrated nation-states have been implementing various 
combinations of macroeconomic and structural policies regardless of their size, but rather in 
accordance with or in contradiction to universal canons of “good” or “bad” economic and social 
policies. This minimization of the role played by country size in growth strategies can be related 
to the growing importance of globalization and regional integration, but also to the exclusive 
focus (in some academic corners) put on supply-side economics. Whatever the causes of this ne-
glect, the issue of country size is hopefully again the object of theoretical and empirical attention.  
 
The most recent works (see Alesina & Spolaore, 2003 and Alesina, Spolaore & Warcziarg, 
2005 for an overview of some models and results) attempt to determine endogenously national 
preferences using size as a causal factor. Country size itself is seen as resulting from a trade-off 
between citizens’ preferences for heterogeneity costs and economies of scale in the provision of 
public goods. However interesting with regard to the causes of the size of nations, this new 
literature somewhat overlooks the consequences of the size of nations.  
 
As such, it does not acknowledge the important progress made in the understanding of 
the “Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations” by the September 1957 International Eco-
nomic Association (IEA) conference held at The Hague, the proceedings of which were published 
in 1960.1 To quote Robinson, in the Introduction of the 1960 volume, the economics and political 
economy of the size of nations is “a subject that well deserves more attention.” 
 
Among several interesting contributions, a paper by Kuznets (1960) stands out as being 
of particular importance. It offers an integrated framework to distinguish small and large coun-
tries’ political economy on measurable criteria: “because of their smaller populations and hence 
possibly greater homogeneity and closer internal ties [small nations] may find it easier to make 
the social adjustments needed to take advantage of the potentialities of modern technology and 
economic growth.” Laurent (2008) interprets Kuznets’s framework to list four country size-
based policy criteria for developed countries, subdivided into two areas: growth strategy and 
governance strategy. 
 
-      Growth strategy:  
 
• Openness: Large and small countries differ on the nature of economic policies that are 
best for their short-term economic growth. As a small country is more open to interna-
tional trade and a large country more closed, the former will benefit more from supply-
side and competitiveness policies, while the latter needs to stimulate its domestic market 
through Keynesian macroeconomic policies in order to grow; 
 
• Adaptation: Because they are more open and more vulnerable to external shocks, small 
countries are forced to adapt to changing economic context faster and will better than 
large ones be able to implement structural changes in their economies; 
 
-      Governance strategy:  
 
• Cohesion: because of smaller population, small countries are more cohesive than large 
ones: trust among citizens and confidence in institutions is generally higher than in 
larger countries, as is governance quality due to a better accountability;  
 
                                                
1See Robinson (1960).  
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• Integration: small countries tend to have less diverse and fragmented populations, which 
brings a contradictory outcome: while anti-immigration sentiment could be higher in 
theory in small countries less accustomed to diversity, public policies against discrimina-
tion and segregation, i.e., integration policy, could be more developed and effective in 
small countries than in large ones, because of the imperative of national cohesion.  
 
Admittedly this framework is a bit simplistic, but it will well serve our purpose. We are 
using the taxonomy of size having the countries of Europe in mind. But if we were to consider 
the world, we would probably have to distinguish at least three types of countries: small, me-
dium and large. Europe, being a collection of small and medium-sized countries, exhibits prob-
lems that would be different if it were characterized by any other combination of sizes (more on 
this below).  
 
This paper thus uses this simple framework first to investigate empirically the difference 
in growth and governance strategies between France and Nordic countries, and then to deter-
mine whether and how Nordic countries’ best practices can help the “French model” out of 
some of its major predicaments.  
 
Table 1 presents the very first elements needed to grasp the difference in terms of growth 
strategy between France and the Nordic countries. France, other like large continental countries, 
is less open regarding international trade (except for Germany, whose growth strategy will be 
discussed in detail infra). France is conversely more open than the two other large continental 
countries in terms of FDI flows and stock. These deviations from the expected can be understood 
using the concepts put forward by Delmas (1965) of “structural openness” and “functional open-
ness.” A small country is structurally more open than a large one because it has limited domes-
tic resources and uses the world market to overcome what Robinson (1960) has called the “pen-
alties of smallness.” Yet, both large and small countries can develop a functional openness, i.e., a 
growth strategy in line or in contradiction with the advantage or disadvantage of size in certain 
contexts. Tax competition in the face of accelerating capital mobility is one obvious modality of 
functional openness for small countries.  
 
Table 1: “Structural” and “functional” openness of Nordic and Continental countries. 
 
Trade to 
GDP 
(%)  
FDI stock 
(% of GDP) 
 
 
Population 
(thousands)  
 
2006 
GDP (billion 
$US, current  
prices and PPPs)  
2006 2006 2007 
Corporate 
tax statutory 
rate (%) 
2007 
 
Norway 4 651 242.6 37.5 19.9 28 
Sweden 9 074 316.7 47.3 57.0 28 
Denmark 5 435 191.5 50.5 49.9 25 
Finland  5 266 172.4 41.9 30.6 26 
Iceland 297 10.9 41.5 48.2 18 
France 61 203 1962.1 27.6 35.0 34.4 
Germany  82 683 2631.6 42.3 17.4 38.9 
Italy 58 643 1699.2 28.2 16.0 33 
 Source: OECD and UNCTAD. 
 
Governance strategy of small countries has been investigated under the label “democ-
ratic corporatism” by Kaztenstein (1985), among others, according to whom cohesive small 
European states are “distinguished by three traits: an ideology of social partnership expressed at 
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the national level; a relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups; and vol-
untary and informal coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political bar-
gaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies, and political parties.”  
 
There is of course a direct relation between growth and governance strategies, clearly ex-
pressed by Kuznets (1960): “It is in the evolution of social institutions and organizations that 
facilitate long-term peaceful type of economic growth (the only type that can be long-term) that 
both the challenge and the promise of economic growth are particularly great for small nations.” 
Without explicit reference, its contemporary influence is obvious in the most recent reflections 
about country size and economic performance: “Country size may also matter, with small coun-
tries sometimes found to undertake more reform, as in Continental Europe over the past two 
decades. Reasons for this could comprise greater population homogeneity, which may ease deci-
sion making, and greater openness to trade, which increases competitive pressures and eases 
concerns that structural reform could lead to imbalances between aggregate demand and sup-
ply” (Economic Policy Reforms, Going for Growth, OECD, 2007). 
 
B. Development, income and growth strategy 
 
We start by examining and analyzing the development and growth performance of 
France in comparison to that of the Nordic countries and then investigate the two sub-issues of 
growth strategy stated in the previous section: short-term and long-term growth strategy. 
 
1) Development and growth performance 
 
The broadest available international measure of development is the Human Develop-
ment Index calculated by the United Nations. It has many shortcomings but it is broadly used in 
view of its simplicity. Table 2 indicates that France’s HDI grew at a faster pace from 1975 to 1995 
than in most Nordic countries, while it slowed significantly from 1995 to 2005. Overall, France 
ranks tenth among the 177 countries investigated, ahead of Finland and Denmark, and well 
ahead of Italy and Germany. 
 
Table 2. Human development dynamic 1975-2005. 
 1975 1995 2005 HDI Ranking 
in 2005 
Growth rate 
1975-1995 
Growth rate 
1995-2005 
Iceland 0.868 0.923 0.968 1 6.0 4.6 
Norway 0.87 0.938 0.968 2 7.2 3.1 
Sweden 0.872 0.935 0.956 6 6.7 2.2 
Finland 0.846 0.918 0.952 11 7.8 3.6 
Denmark 0.875 0.916 0.949 14 4.5 3.5 
France 0.856 0.925 0.952 10 7.5 2.8 
Italy 0.845 0.91 0.941 20 7.1 3.3 
Germany  0.913 0.935 22  2.4 
Source: United Nations. 
 
Table 3 allows a closer look at the French performance in 2005: France ranks eleventh for 
life expectancy at birth and for combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment 
ratio, but only eighteenth for GDP per capita (PPP $U.S.). The explanation of the better rank of 
Sweden, Iceland and Norway is to be found in the GDP per capita index, while the major 
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strengths of France are the education index and, to a lesser extent, life expectancy. From these 
very first observations, France’s problem seems not to be one of development, but of growth of 
income. What is more, France shares this problem with the two other large continental countries. 
 
Table 3. Breakdown of HDI performance in 2005. 
 Education Life expectancy GDP per capita 
 
Iceland 
 
0.978 
 
0.941 
 
0.985 
Norway 0.991 0.913 1.000 
Sweden 0.978 0.925 0.965 
Finland 0.993 0.898 0.964 
Denmark 0.993 0.881 0.973 
France 0.982 0.919 0.954 
Italy 0.958 0.922 0.944 
Germany 0.953 0.902 0.949 
        Source: United Nations. 
 
Two other measures help us to confirm this intuition. First is the dynamic of GDP per cap-
ita from 1970 to 2006 presented in Table 4. France’s expansion is faster from 1970 (ahead of two 
out of five Nordic countries) to 1980 (ahead of just one) and still, barely, to 1990 (ahead of none) 
than the EU 15 and OECD average. It holds well when compared to Nordic countries, even if it 
has been surpassed by all of them. But the pace is lost from 1990 on and, in 2006, France is 
roughly fifteen percentage points behind the least prosperous Nordic country, and an astound-
ing fifty points short of the wealthiest, as are Italy and Germany. France and Germany started in 
1970 ahead of the OECD and EU 15 average while they both lagged behind in 2006. 
 
Table 4. Volume index of GDP per capita (OECD = 100 in 2000), at 2000 price levels and PPPs. 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
Denmark  63,2 76,1 93 115,8 125,8 
Finland  49,2 68,2 88,1 103,2 120,7 
Iceland  51,1 84,4 99,1 115,6 134,7 
Norway  57,7 86,5 106,8 145,1 159,4 
Sweden  66,8 78,5 94,7 111,5 128,6 
France 53,6 72,5 87,1 101,5 107,9 
Germany  53,5 70,6 87,7 104,2 110,1 
Italy  50,4 69,9 88,2 102,8 104,9 
EU15 total  51,6 67,4 83,6 101,1 109,2 
OECD total  52,6 67 83,4 100 109,1 
        Source: OECD. 
 
An even better measure of income dynamic is OECD’s GNI per capita (defined as GDP plus 
net receipts from abroad of wages and salaries and of property income), especially since Nordic 
countries are small countries. Chart 1 shows that France is very close to the Nordic countries 
from 1970 to 1990. In the beginning of the 1990s, France starts to fall behind. In 2006, France 
ranks last and the gap has widened, especially with Sweden, Denmark and Norway.  
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Chart 1. 
 
How can we make sense of this recent (mis)performance? Is there something in the Nordic 
countries’ growth strategy than can be learned by France? 
 
2) Productivity, population and employment rates 
 
Actual economic growth is the sum of the rate of increase of labor productivity per hour 
and that of the number of hours worked. The latter depends on demographic, social (duration of 
the working week, rate of participation, etc.) and economic factors (the degree of slack in the 
labor market).  
 
- Labor productivity: 
 
Productivity is the natural figure to look at when a country falls behind in terms of in-
come per capita. Yet, in the case of France, this indicator could be misleading. The Groningen 
database2 ranks France only second to Norway in terms of GDP per hour (in 1990 GK $), with 
35.33 against 37.93, but ahead of Sweden (30.74), Denmark (30.26), Finland (29.80) and Iceland 
(23.64).  
 
                                                
2The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, Janu-
ary 2008, http://www.conference-board.org/economics/  
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But if the level of French productivity indeed remains higher than four out of five Nordic 
countries, French productivity has been growing at a slower rate than that of most Nordic 
countries since the middle of the 1990s , with the exception of Denmark (Chart 2).  
 
 
Chart 2. 
 
- Population 
 
Turning to demographic factors, it seems that here France is in a much better position: it 
is, at least in Europe, a model for fertility rate, as it has resisted much better than all Nordic 
states the wave of decline in fertility rates observed in the EU. France is actually the most 
dynamic EU country in terms of fertility rate in 2005 (Table 5), which was not the case in 1960, 
but fertility rates started to increase in 1990 in France. The relative dynamic in France and 
Nordic countries from 1990 is almost exactly the opposite of that of income per capita. 
 
Table 5. Total (period) fertility rates. 
 1960/1964 1970/1974 1980/1984 1990/1994 2000/2003 2004/2005 
Denmark 2.58 1.97 1.44 1.73 1.75 1.78 
Finland 2.68 1.64 1.68 1.82 1.74 1.80 
Sweden 2.30 1.90 1.64 2.04 1.62 1.75 
France 2.83 2.36 1.88 1.72 1.89 1.90 
EU-15 2.67 2.23 1.72 1.50 1.50 1.55 
          Source: European Commission. 
 
     -     Employment rates. 
 
When one looks at employment rates in France and at their evolution over time, it seems 
easier to explain the previous observations. First of all, France has the lowest (by far) total em-
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ployment rate when compared to the Nordic countries (Table 6), to Germany and the OECD aver-
age. Only Italy is doing worse.  
 
                                          Table 6. Total employment rates in 2006. 
Denmark 76.9 
Finland 68.9 
Iceland 85.3 
Norway 75.5 
Sweden 74.5 
France 62.3 
Germany 67.2 
Italy 58.4 
OECD total 66.1 
Source: OECD. 
 
Yet the French “employment problem” is heavily concentrated (Table 7): it concerns the 
two extreme age groups, young and old workers, while the employment rate of the bulk of the 
labor force in 2006 was close to that of Nordic countries, higher than Germany and Italy, higher 
than the OECD and EU 15 average, and has increased from 1970 to 2006. For young and old 
French workers, data show the opposite dynamic.  
 
Table 7. Total employment rates, 1970-2006. 
  1970   1990   2006  
 
 age group 
15-24 
 age group 
25-54 
 age group 
55-64 
 age group 
15-24 
 age group 
25-54 
age group 
55-64 
 age group 
15-24 
 age group 
25-54 
age group 
55-64 
 
Denmark  .. .. .. 65.0 84.0 53.6 63.7 85.5 60.9 
Finland 57.8 80.7 56.8 52.2 87.9 42.8 40.6 82.5 54.5 
Norway  .. .. .. 53.4 82.2 61.5 53.1 84.4 67.4 
Sweden 61.5 78.9 63.7 66.1 91.6 69.5 44.0 84.7 69.8 
Iceland  .. .. .. .. .. .. 72.9 89.1 84.9 
France  52.1 72.6 55.5 29.5 77.4 35.6 25.3 80.0 40.5 
Italy  39.3 59.2 28.6 29.8 68.2 32.6 25.5 73.3 32.5 
Germany  70.0 71.4 49.6 56.4 73.6 36.8 43.9 78.8 48.5 
OECD 53.1 69.1 53.9 48.8 75.8 48.0 43.3 76.5 53.0 
EU15 50.9 65.0 46.6 45.2 73.4 38.5 40.2 78.6 45.6 
Source: OECD. 
 
From these elements, it seems that France, confronted with declining economic growth, 
has opted for a model of exclusion from the labor market of young and old workers, leaving on-
ly the very productive employed. This evolution points to a key pattern of the French model 
since the 1990s and a major difference, not only with the Nordic countries, but also with Ger-
many: France has developed a “Malthusian productivity,” increasing its level by leaving work-
ers with low productivity out of the labor force. 
 
This combination of a high level of productivity but low employment rates of some less 
productive categories of the population was actually the argument put forward by Lindert 
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(2004) to explain why the welfare state was essentially a “free lunch.” In the case of France, this 
process is not a free lunch: declining employment rates (and rising unemployment) for certain 
categories of the population have reduced the overall income per capita.  
 
Table 8 confirms that the French problem is not, to put it in the words of Paul Krugman, 
one of “inspiration” but of “perspiration” (not of productivity but employment rates and num-
ber of hours worked). This latter factor accounted for virtually the entire income gap between 
France and the U.S. in 2006, which is not the case for any other country surveyed. Table 9 shows 
in addition that the “perspiration problem” of France lies more on the side of employment rates 
than on the side of persons in employment working shorter hours (which are quite comparable 
to Norway, Sweden or Denmark). 
 
Table 8. Breakdown of GDP per capita in its components in 2006. 
 
Gap in GDP per capita 
with respect to the 
U.S. (in % points) 
Gap in GDP per hour 
worked with respect 
to the US (in % 
points) 
Gap in hours 
worked per capita 
with respect to the 
U.S. (in % points) 
Iceland -18 -29 15 
Norway 18 41 -16 
Sweden -20 -11 -10 
Denmark -20 -15 -5 
Finland  -25 -18 -8 
France -29 -1 -28 
Germany -27 -7 -22 
Italy -34 -24 -13 
OECD -30 -25 -7 
Euro area  -29 -14 -18 
         Source: OECD. 
 
For the French model, the level of productivity is hence a strength by default, due to 
lower employment rates, and, to a lesser extent, shorter hours worked. The major French prob-
lem and difference with the Nordic countries is thus employment rates. But this problem can’t 
be summed up by the proverbial “structural rigidities” in the labor market, as it is more broadly 
related to real GDP growth, itself related to macroeconomic management copiloted with fellow 
member states of the euro area (see Fitoussi, 2006). On this matter, Nordic countries’ profitable 
lessons are limited.  
 
Table 9. Average hours actually worked (Hours per year per person in employment). 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
Denmark  1879 1646 1518 1554 1584 
Finland  1982 1849 1769 1750 1721 
Iceland  2158 1864 1839 1885 1794 
Norway 1835 1580 1503 1455 1407 
Sweden 1730 1517 1561 1625 1583 
France  2012 1842 1702 1591 1564 
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Germany  .. .. .. 1473 1436 
Italy  2145 1950 1902 1861 1800 
EU15 total  1876 1773 1723 1655 1625 
OECD total  1969 1893 1862 1812 1777 
        Source: OECD.  
 
3) Real GDP growth and macroeconomic management 
 
France is not only a large country, while Nordic countries are small; it is a large country 
that belongs to the euro area and, as such, it has been engaged in a process of monetary unifi-
cation since the early 1990s. French real GDP growth follows almost exactly euro area economic 
growth from 1971 to 2007 (which is made at 75 percent by the large continental countries), see 
Table 10.  
 
Table 10. Real GDP growth rate, 1971-2007. 
 1971-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2007 
Denmark 2.6 1.9 2.4 2.0 
Finland 3.6 3.5 1.6 3.3 
Iceland 6.5 3.2 2.2 3.9 
Norway 4.7 3.1 3.7 2.4 
Sweden 2.0 2.3 1.6 3.0 
France 3.5 2.5 1.9 1.9 
Euro area 3.5 2.3 2.2 2.0 
OECD total 3.8 2.9 2.6 2.5 
       Source: OECD. 
 
Fitoussi (1995, 2002) has argued that the rules chosen for European monetary integration 
have been very costly in terms of growth and unemployment. European monetary unification 
indeed came at a high price for the future euro area’s member states, as restrictive monetary pol-
icy increased markedly the regional critical gap and unemployment rate (see Chart 3). 
 
Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) have gathered empirical evidence that monetary unifica-
tion was systematically biased in favor of the small states of the euro area, given the rules of the 
“European economic constitution.” The fact that the single market and economic policy con-
straints give small countries the advantage of trade while not allowing large countries to com-
pensate for their handicap by active macroeconomic policies may explain part of the divergence 
in their performance in the recent period (and the overall disappointing record of the euro area). 
 
Here, a major difference between France and Germany has appeared in recent years. 
While France has relied on the stimulation of its domestic market to grow, which is at odds with 
euro area rules, Germany has adopted since the mid-1990s, but especially since 2000, a small-
country growth strategy. The country’s trade openness is actually higher in 2006 than that of 
Norway, Iceland and Finland (Chart 4). 
 
Laurent and Le Cacheux (2007) noted that if the German competitiveness effort has been 
a huge success in terms of net exports growth, it is still hardly compatible with the fact that Ger-
many is a large country. It appears that the “shrinking” of Germany has, so far, been a counter-
productive small country growth strategy. 
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So why did Germany choose it in the first place? One can argue that in the face of global-
ization, all countries have become small and that Germany simply decided to acknowledge this 
fact. But Germany is first and foremost part of European integration. As such, it is subject to the 
incentives system devised by the “European economic constitution,” whereby large countries 
are encouraged to behave like small ones, competing through real “social disinflation” rather 
than nominal exchange-rate policy, adopting competitiveness policies focused on labor cost re-
duction. Since large continental countries are precisely not small, the results are neither good for 
them nor, even worse, for the euro area. These policies have triggered strategic reactions from 
the other large countries, which in turn engage in the social race to the bottom. Some elements of 
this worst-case scenario for euro area social models have already appeared (see Laurent, 2006), 
measurable for instance by the intensity of tax competition in the EU compared to the rest of the 
world (Chart 5).  
 
 
 
Chart 3. 
 
 
  
 
 12 
 
Chart 4. 
 
 
Chart 5 
 
If France wants to increase income per capita, the solution is thus not to follow Germany 
in trying to metamorphose into a small country. The euro area as a whole is fundamentally a big 
 13 
closed economy: its degree of openness is close to that of the U.S. This means that it should al-
low for reactive macroeconomic policies at the regional and national levels in order to make the 
most of its domestic market if it wants to stimulate its economic growth, like many large and 
middle countries in the developed world (like the U.S. and the UK). Otherwise, in applying eco-
nomic rules made for small economies while it is indeed a large economy, it runs the risk of 
structurally jeopardizing growth, pitting its largest economies against one another, and turning 
monetary union into a zero, or even a negative-sum game.  
 
3) Structural reform and long-term growth 
 
Because they are more open and more vulnerable to external shocks, small countries are 
forced to adapt to changing economic contexts more quickly, and will, better than large ones, be 
able to implement structural changes in their economies. In the current economic context, this 
should mean that Nordic countries are more able than France to invest in the knowledge econo-
my and sustainable development. Here, contrary to macroeconomic management, they can be 
an example.  
 
In a nutshell the mechanism is the following: structural adjustment in a small country 
has a high rate of return because, by increasing competitiveness, it acts on the major component 
of its demand, i.e., exports. The sacrifice it implies in term of restricting internal demand is thus 
short-lived, which gives to the government more room to maneuver to implement the most 
profitable investment policies. In a medium-sized country such is not the case, as the sacrifice in 
terms of internal demand may be long-lasting before bearing its fruits, since the increase in com-
petitiveness concerns a small fraction of total demand.  
 
This means that, in a small economy, a supply-side policy is after all a demand policy in 
such a way that these countries do not need the instruments of a demand policy. In a medium- 
sized economy, this is not the case and the government has to pursue a two-handed policy using 
different instruments. This brings us back to the flaws of European economic rules, blocking ac-
cess to these instruments absent a demand policy at the European level. It is no wonder then if it 
does not constrain small economies but big ones. The rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
which do not discriminate between government investment and consumption, and which 
France is obligated to follow, are typically not well adapted to pursue a long-term growth policy 
(see Fitoussi, Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2007, for a critical presentation and reform options).  
 
-      Knowledge economy. 
 
France, like the two other large continental economies, is not investing as much as it 
should in the knowledge economy. As shown in Table 11, the overall investment in knowledge 
in France, Germany and Italy is lower than the OECD average and much lower than in the Nor-
dic countries. The evolution since 1997 is negative. The breakdown into three major components 
allows us to identify R&D as the major problem of France. Public R&D is not so much at fault as 
private R&D (Table 12). In this chapter, France has to take its inspiration from the Nordic 
countries. 
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Table 11. Investment in Knowledge, 2004, in % of GDP. 
 R&D Software Higher 
Education 
Investment in 
Knowledge 
Change in investment in 
knowledge to GDP ratio 
(1997-2004) 
Denmark   2.58 1.36 1.16 5.10 1.29 
Finland   3.49 1.31 1.11 5.92 0.72 
Sweden   3.98 1.54 0.93 6.44 0.86 
France 2.20 1.16 0.95 4.31 0.49 
Italy   1.14 0.57 0.68 2.38 0.38 
Germany 2.54 0.64 0.73 3.90 0.43 
OECD  2.41 1.08 1.42 4.91 0.69 
    Source: OECD. 
 
Table 12. Private and public R&D, 2003, in % of GDP 
 Private R&D Public R&D Total R&D 
Norway 1.0 0.74 1.74 
Denmark 1.75 0.78 2.53 
Iceland 1.67 1.27 2.94 
Finland 2.46 1.01 3.47 
Sweden 2.95 1.02 3.97 
France 1.36 0.79 2.15 
 
-      Sustainable development. 
 
The performance of France in terms of climate change is flattering, the country being 
ahead of its Kyoto target, which is not the case with Norway and Iceland. But France has not 
made a genuine effort to reorient its energy mix towards renewable sources, with the share of 
renewable energy actually falling from 1990 to 2005 (Table 13). Even Finland, which also relies 
on nuclear energy, has developed renewable energies in its energy mix. 
 
On both counts, France should take note of the Nordic countries’ long-term growth poli-
cies. But how can large countries be inspired by small countries’ ability to foster change if they 
cannot implement it in practice because they lack the corresponding institutions and govern-
ance? We now thus turn to these issues. 
 
Table 13. Climate change and renewable energy performance. 
 
GHG emissions 
growth 1990-2005 Kyoto target 
 
Share of renewable 
energies in primary 
energy consumption 1990  
 
Share of renewable energies 
in primary energy 
consumption 2005 
Denmark -7.8 -21.0 6.7 16.2 
Sweden -7.4 4.0 24.9 29.8 
Finland -2.6 0.0 19.2 23.2 
Norway 8.8 1.0 53.2 40.4 
Iceland 10.5 10.0 64.9 73.0 
France -1.9 0.0 7.0 6.0 
Germany -18.7 -21.0 1.6 4.8 
Italy 12.1 -6.1 4.2 6.5 
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Spain 52.3 15.0 7.0 6.1 
EU-15 -2.0 -8.0 4.9 6.7 
EU-27 -11.0  4.4 6.7 
Source: European Environmental Agency. 
 
B. Trust, confidence and governance strategy 
 
If the question is merely one of public and social spending, France is now “out-nordic-
ing” almost all Nordic countries. Public social spending in France is in fact higher than in all 
Nordic countries except Sweden (Chart 6). What is more, France has increased its total spending 
from 1990 to 2007 to reach 53 percent of GDP (Chart 7), whereas Nordic countries have either 
stabilized or decreased theirs. 
 
But of course the quantity of public and social spending does not guarantee policy suc-
cess, it is the quality of the expenditures that matters. In this respect, a lively debate has devel-
oped in France about the Nordic model of generalized trust, confidence in institutions and gov-
ernance quality. This new literature points at the development of “distrust” in France as a poten-
tial blocker of social policy efficiency and turns to Nordic countries for inspiration. Danish 
“flexisecurity” in particular is praised by the increasingly influential proposition of “profes-
sional paths securization.” We now explore this debate and start by asking ourselves whether 
France can be seen as “distrustful” or not. 
 
 
Chart 6 
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Chart 7 
 
1) The paradox of French pessimism: fertility and the future 
 
The first form of trust we look at is confidence in the future or optimism about the future. 
As noted in Fitoussi and Laurent (2007), there is a paradox here between subjective French pes-
simism, recurrently expressed and highlighted for instance in the Eurobarometer surveys, and 
an objective booming fertility rate, which can be interpreted as a sign of confidence in the future. 
In the EU, France has both the highest fertility rate and the most pessimistic public opinion 
about the future. Here again, France is clearly at odds with Nordic countries, where optimism in 
the future and fertility are both high (Chart 8). 
 
Admittedly, French fertility dynamism can be related to the generosity of family policy 
in France. But how can it coexist with such pessimism about the future? One possible explana-
tion is that the French malaise is a public or social malaise rather than a private one. French in-
stitutions and/or social relations would be feeding negative subjective sentiments. While the 
correlation between private happiness and public or social optimism is typically very high, 
France appears to be too socially pessimistic for its level of private happiness, as illustrated in 
Table 14. This observation brings us to the question of generalized trust and confidence in in-
stitutions. 
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Chart 8. 
 
 
 
Table 14. Happiness and pessimism, 2006. 
 
How happy  
are you ?  
(% “very happy”) 
For most people in country life  
is getting worse  
(% “agree”) 
Germany 47.6 70.0 
Denmark 80.3 15.6 
Finland 74.5 22.3 
Norway 69.4 13.3 
Sweden 68.0 29.1 
France 48.4 84.4 
Total 51.7 51.6 
 Source: European Social Survey. 
 
 
2) France’s “crisis of confidence”? Generalized trust and confidence in institutions  
 
A new literature tries to explore the connection between France’s dysfunctional social 
model and trust and confidence in institutions among the French people. Using inter alia 1980-
2000 World Values Survey data, Algan and Cahuc (2007) go so far as to argue that “the deficit in 
trust among French accounts for 66 percent of the income gap with Sweden” and that French 
GDP would “be increased by 5 percent or 1500 euros per person if French trusted their fellow 
citizens like the Swedish do.” The interesting point of this literature is the shift from the typical 
OECD Job Study perspective that attributes most of French evils to “structural rigidities” in the 
labor market. The idea here is to investigate whether dysfunctions, inter alia in the labor market, 
and more generally in the French social model, derive primarily from a lack of generalized trust 
and confidence. 
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- Generalized trust 
 
Algan and Cahuc (2007) argue that the “spiral of defiance is what prevents France from imple-
menting a social-democracy of the Scandinavian type.” The “trust deficit” among the French, 
which authors relate to un-civic attitudes, “blocks cooperation abilities and social dialogue,” so 
that the State is forced to intervene in social relations, harming social partners’ legitimacy, which 
further increases “defiance” among workers, firms and the State. On possible remedies out of 
this predicament, Cahuc and Algan (2006) warn that: “civic attitudes cannot be systematically 
changed quickly just by changing institutions… civic attitudes impose real constraints on the 
choice of labour market institutions. From this point of view, it is unlikely that countries with 
weak public-spiritedness can implement the Danish Model without specific action aimed at 
changing the values of their citizens.” The French should thus find ways to amend their civic 
attitudes in order to benefit from a more efficient and egalitarian social model like Nordic 
countries.  
  
Let’s first take a look at “generalized trust” in France (without here, for lack of space, dis-
cussing this notion theoretically and empirically) according to the latest available wave of the 
World Values Survey. Table 15 reports that France seems indeed to be an exception in this re-
spect, not only compared with Nordic countries but also to Italy and Germany.  
 
Table 15. Generalized trust. 
(Percentage of people responding “most people can be trusted” to the question: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”) 
Denmark 64 
Finland 57 
Norway 65 
Sweden 64 
France 21 
Italy 32 
Germany 33 
     Source: OECD, Data from the 1999-2004 wave of the World Values Survey. 
 
A closer look at the evolution of generalized trust in France since the 1980s in the light of 
the European values survey data reveals that generalized trust was actually higher in France in 
the 1980s than it is now, while the French social model was closer to its original features than it 
is now. In every other country in the table, trust has increased (Table 16). 
 
Table 16. Generalized trust. (response to same question as above) 
 1981 1990 1999/2000 
Sweden  56.7 66.1 66.3 
Norway  60.9 65.1  
Iceland  39.8 43.6 41.1 
Denmark  52.7 57.7 66.5 
Finland   62.7 57.4 
France  24.8 22.8 21.3 
Italy  26.8 35.3 32.6 
W. Germany/Germany   37.9 37.5 
      Source: European Values Survey. 
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- Confidence in institutions  
 
But Cahuc and Algan (2007) insist that trust should also be considered under the angle of 
confidence in public institutions such as the legal system, the Parliament, trade unions. The 
French, they argue, have exceptionally lower confidence in their institutions than other coun-
tries, most of all the Nordic ones. Table 17 shows a more nuanced picture for trust in Parliament 
and the civil sector, with France actually topping Finland, Germany and Italy. 
 
Table 17. Share of respondents reporting high levels of trust in different entities in the early 2000s. 
 
Trust in 
Parliament 
Trust in the 
civil sector 
 
Denmark 0.49 0.55 
Finland 0.44 0.41 
Iceland 0.72 0.56 
Norway 0.69 0.51 
Sweden 0.51 0.49 
France 0.41 0.46 
Germany 0.36 0.39 
Italy 0.34 0.33 
Source: OECD, Data from the 1999-2004 wave of the World Values Survey. 
 
But the real problem highlighted by Cahuc and Algan (2007) is the higher level of people 
in France declaring no trust in institutions at all. Tables 18 and 19 (reporting percentages of lack 
of trust) show that in this respect France was indeed in 2000 the least trustful of all countries sur-
veyed for all dimensions studied, except for confidence in the social security system, in which 
Italians put even less confidence than the French. The important point here is that the French 
pattern seems to be different from Germany but quite close to Italy. Yet, again, some observa-
tions are puzzling. For instance, French seem to trust trade unions more in 2000 than in 1990, 
while trust in all other institutions has declined over this period. Note also that the social secur-
ity system (arguably a large part of the “French social model”) appears to be the most trusted of 
all French institutions in 1990 and 2000. 
 
Table 18. Lack of confidence in institutions, 1990. 
Percentage of people responding “none at all” to the question: “How much trust do you have…” ? 
 
in the legal 
system 
in 
Parliament in trade unions in civil service 
in the social 
security system 
Sweden 7.7 11.1 14.8 8.5 12.3 
Norway 2.5 5.1 6.6 6.7 8.9 
Iceland 4.0 8.2 7.5 7.5 4.5 
Denmark 1.6 9.6 13.7 5.3 3.5 
Finland 3.1 15.1 12.5 11.9 2.3 
France 10.8 17.3 28.7 15.5 7.1 
Italy 21.9 22.6 21.9 28.4 20.6 
W. Germany 4.0 7.0 16.6 10.2 3.6 
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Table 19. Lack of confidence in institutions, 1999/2000. 
Percentage of people responding “none at all” to the question: “How much trust do you have…” ? 
 in the justice 
system 
in 
Parliament 
in trade 
unions 
in civil 
service 
in the social security 
system 
Sweden 4.7 6.1 9.7 5.4 5.3 
Iceland 3.9 2.8 6.2 3.5 7.2 
Denmark 2.3 6.7 8.4 4.3 2.8 
Finland 3.5 9.4 6.9 8.3 3.8 
France 19.5  23.6 25.4 17.7  9.8 
Italy 19.1 16.8 24.0 15.2 18.8 
Germany 6.9 16.0 13.1 11.7 8.8 
  Source: EuropeanValues Survey. 
 
From these first observations, two related questions emerge: is the French social model 
really to blame for the lack of trust among citizens? Is the poor quality of institutions in France 
to blame for the French lack of confidence in them?  
 
Let’s start with the second question: are French right about the quality of their institutions 
and governance? Do they exhibit significantly less quality than in other countries, the Nordic 
ones to start with? 
 
- Indicators of governance quality  
 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi have built a dataset of indicators widely used in the 
field of development policy, but that can prove useful here as well, although one would expect 
rich western democratic countries not to differ much in terms of governance quality. Actually, 
they do, and French institutions seem of lesser quality, not only than institutions in the Nordic 
countries but also in Germany, while Italy is in all dimensions studies the least well ranked 
(Table 20). According to the data, the lack of confidence in institutions would find a logical ex-
planation, and reforms thus would be needed in this department to improve confidence. But the 
lower level of confidence in institutions could also be explained by disappointed high expec-
tations.  
 
Table 20. Governance score (-2,5 to +2,5). 
       
 
Political 
stability 
Voice and 
accountability 
Government 
effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
law 
Control of 
 corruption 
Denmark 0.82 1.72 2.29 1.81 2.03 2.39 
Finland 1.47 1.63 2.08 1.70 1.95 2.57 
Iceland 1.60 1.47 2.13 1.62 2.03 2.46 
Norway 1.21 1.64 2.10 1.34 2.02 2.13 
Sweden 
1.13 1.55 2.00 1.44 1.86 2.24 
France 0.46 1.40 1.20 1.06 1.31 1.44 
Germany 0.83 1.48 1.52 1.39 1.77 1.78 
Italy 0.28 1.14 0.38 0.84 0.37 0.31 
Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 
1996-2006. 
 
 21 
- What determines generalized trust?  
 
The question of the determinants of generalized trust remains. Should we attribute it, as sug-
gested by Algan and Cahuc (2007), to poor civic attitudes reinforced by an omnipresent State? 
Does it depend on confidence in institutions, in which case solving the confidence crisis in insti-
tutions would increase generalized trust? Does it depend on a cultural mind-frame unrelated to 
the institutional context or, better, of which the institutional context would be a consequence 
and not a cause? Table 19, even if it does not present rigorous econometric tests, allows measur-
ing the relative importance of subjective, economic, institutional and civic variables in the deter-
mination of trust. The importance of civic variables appears doubtful (a result in line with the 
literature), as in the determination of the most significant determinant of generalized trust 
(Tables 21 & 22). 
 
Table 21. Determinants of generalized trust, 2004. 
  
 Coefficient Significance 
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair 0.40 0 
Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves 0.22 0 
How happy are you 0.03 0.0005 
How satisfied with present state of economy in country 0.08 0 
Any period of unemployment and work seeking within last 5 years 0.09 0.0193 
Trust in country's parliament 0.06 0 
How satisfied with the way democracy works in country 0.04 0 
Trust in the legal system 0.03 0.0005 
Citizens should not cheat on taxes 0.04 0.0983 
You should always obey law even if it means missing good opportunities 0.02 0.2905 
Occasionally alright to ignore law and do what you want -0.02 0.3673 
Falsely claim government benefit: social security or other, last 5 years -0 0.7912 
Intercept 0.19  
Valid N 9884  
Adjusted R Squared 0.411  
 
 
Table 22. Determinants of “subjective trust,” 2004. 
Dependent variable: “Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair” 
 Coefficient Significance 
How happy are you 0.2 0 
How satisfied with present state of economy in country 0.12 0 
Any period of unemployment and work seeking within last 5 years 0.16 0.0003 
Trust in the legal system 0.10 0 
How satisfied with the way democracy works in country 0.07 0 
Trust in country's parliament 0.05 0 
Falsely claim government benefit: social security or other, last 5 years -0.04 0.0523 
Citizens should not cheat on taxes 0.03 0.2777 
You should always obey law even if it means missing good opportunities 0.02 0.4575 
Occasionally all right to ignore law and do what you want 0 0.9419 
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Intercept 2.03  
Valid N 9911  
Adjusted R Squared 0.161  
       Source: European Social Survey. 
 
What kind of lessons should France take from the Nordic countries on the chapter of gener-
alized trust and confidence in institutions? From our very limited observations, improving insti-
tutions’ democratic quality and the state of the economy could prove useful. The role of equality 
policies should also not be overlooked. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) indeed argue that: “low 
levels of trust and social capital that plague many countries are caused by too little government 
action to reduce inequality.” They insist that: “the policies most effective in reducing inequalities 
are universal social policies. These policies stem from our sense of generalized trust – and, in 
turn, help to create a more trusting society.” As shown in Table 23, France is less egalitarian in 
this respect than all Nordic countries except Norway. 
 
Table 23. Income inequality indicators. 
 Gini Index (2006)  Income quintile  
share ratio (2006) 
Denmark 24 3.4 
Finland 26  
Sweden 24 3.5 
Iceland 26 3.7 
Norway 30 4.6 
France 27 4.0 
Italy 32 5.5 
Germany 27 4.1 
      Source : Eurostat. 
 
This argument is all the more important in the current French context that contemporary 
evolution of income inequality in France in the recent period seems to have been overlooked, as 
documented empirically by Landais (2007), whose findings are summarized in Table 24. 
 
Table 24. Income evolution in France, 1998-2005. 
P 99,99-100 +42.6%   
P 99,9-100 +32.0%    
P 99-100 +19.4%     
P 95-100 +11.3%   
P 90-100 +8.7%     
P 0-90 +4.6%     
Median income + 4.9% 
  Source: Landais (2007). 
 
3) France’s “crisis of confidence”? The role of trade unions and job satisfaction 
 
A final issue touching on the matter of trust in general regards the role played by trade 
unions in the French social model and the general level of social relations quality that results 
from it, with job satisfaction as an indicator of this quality. Phillipon (2007), also taking Nordic 
countries as a reference, argues that France is burdened with poor workplace relations due to 
the absence of strong trade unions and resulting in low job satisfaction. Table 25 illustrates some 
of Phillipon’s arguments.  
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Table 25. Workplace relations and job satisfaction. 
 Workplace relations quality Job satisfaction 
Finland 5.42 65.0 
Denmark 5.97 72.5 
Sweden 5.92 56.9 
Norway 5.72  
France 3.33 47.2 
Germany 5.25 60.3 
Italy 4.22 53.6 
Source : Philippon (2007), p. 14, data from Global Competitiveness Report and World Value Survey. 
 
While workplace relations quality seems to be markedly low in France, its relation to the 
weakness of trade unions must be considered cautiously. Trade union density has not changed 
much for the last fifteen years in France and was always much lower than that of Nordic coun-
tries. What is more, Italy’s union density is higher than Germany’s with workplace relations 
quality higher in Germany (Chart 9). What is true, however, is that trade unions seem to be the 
least trusted institutions in France (see supra Table 19). 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 9. 
 
On the consequences side, a closer look at the dynamic of job satisfaction through the 
European values survey also seems to bring some qualifications. Philippon’s data can be recon-
stituted by adding the highest three levels of job satisfaction, but a different picture appears 
while considering the lowest three or levels 6 and 7 of satisfaction (fairly high), where France is 
the highest ranked of all countries surveyed (Table 26). The evolution of job satisfaction through 
time is also puzzling, with satisfaction in France increasing in the last two decades, while it has 
decreased, for instance, in Sweden (Table 27).  
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Table 26. Job satisfaction  
Percentage of respondents to the question, “How satisfied are you with your job?” 
 France  Germany  Italy  Denmark  Sweden  Finland  Iceland  
dissatisfied 1.8 0.9 2.0 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.5 
2 1.1 0.5 1.3 0.9 2.3 0.9 0.3 
3 1.5 1.0 2.3 1.1 2.3 2.0 0.9 
4 3.5 1.8 3.5 1,4 3.2 1.6 2.1 
5 10.7 5.1 6.8 5.3 7.5 4,7 4.0 
6 10.8 9.3 11.2 6.7 10.0 7.6 7.8 
7 22.4 19.9 19.2 11.2 17.6 19.1 17.9 
8 26,4 30.2 25.6 25.6 30.6 35.8 30.8 
9 13.2 17.4 13.0 25.3 17.8 20.1 21.4 
satisfied 8.4 13.9 15.1 21.6 8.1 8.1 14.4 
 
8 + 9 + 10 48 61.5 53.7 72.5 56.5 64.0 66.6 
1 + 2 + 3 4.4 2.4 5.6 2.8 5.2 3.1 1.7 
Source: European values survey. 
 
 
Table 27. Job satisfaction through time in France and Sweden. 
Percentage of respondents to the question, “How satisfied are you with your job?” 
 France 1981 France 1999 Sweden 1981 Sweden 1999 
dissatisfied 2.7 1.8 0.3 0.6 
2 2.5 1.1 1.4 2.3 
3 3.7 1.5 2.6 2.3 
4 3.4 3.5 1.8 3.2 
5 14.4 10.7 5.6 7.5 
6 13.4 10.8 6.2 10.0 
7 17.7 22.4 12.2 17.6 
8 21.6 26.4 27.0 30.6 
9 11.0 13.2 22.2 17.8 
satisfied 9.5 8.4 20.7 8.1 
8 + 9 + 10 42.1 48.0 69.9 56.5 
     Source: European values survey. 
 
3. Diversity and Integration  
 
In the final part of this paper, we try to shed some light on the question of integration 
policy, i.e., policies against discriminations and segregation. Logic would want diversity and 
fragmentation to be higher in large countries than in small ones, in France than in Nordic coun-
tries. We start by reviewing empirical evidence of this intuition.  
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1) Diversity and fragmentation 
 
-      Diversity 
 
Table 28 shows that diversity, captured by the ratio of the foreign-born population to the 
total population, appears to be higher in France in 2005 than in Denmark or Finland, but lower 
than in Norway, and much lower than in Sweden. Yet the foreign population is higher in 2005 in 
France than in all Nordic countries. While the data for Germany confirm the link between coun-
try size and diversity, figures for Italy contradict it.  
 
Table 28. Foreign-born and foreign populations, as a percentage of the total population. 
 Foreign-born population Foreign population 
  1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 
 
Denmark 4.8 5.8 6.5 4.2 4.8 5.0 
Finland  2.0 2.6 3.4 1.3 1,8 2.2 
Norway  5.5 6.8 8.2 3.8 4.0 4.8 
Sweden 10.5 11.3 12.4 6.0 5.4 5.3 
France  .. 7.3 8.1 .. 5.6 5.8 
Germany 11.5 12.5 12.9 8.8 8.9 8.8 
Italy .. 2.5 .. 1.7 2.4 4.6 
    Source: OECD. 
 
-      Fragmentation 
 
Table 29 yields mixed results with regards to fragmentation. According to ethnic and 
religion indexes, France (and Germany and Italy) are more fragmented than Nordic countries 
(except Finland, for the ethnic criterion). But the language index is higher in Finland and Swe-
den? Overall, still, continental countries (and France among them) appear more fragmented than 
Nordic ones. 
 
Table 29. Fragmentation indexes. 
 Ethnic Language Religion 
Denmark 0.08 0.10 0.23 
Finland 0.13 0.14 0.25 
Iceland 0.08 0.08 0.19 
Norway 0.06 0.07 0.20 
Sweden 0.06 0.20 0.23 
France 0.10 0.12 0.40 
Germany 0.17 0.16 0.66 
Italy 0.11 0.11 0.30 
Source: Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg, 
“Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8,2 (June 2003): 155-194. 
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2) Discrimination and segregation 
  
With diversity and fragmentation higher in France and continental countries, one would 
expect attitudes towards immigration to be more positive. The reverse is actually true, with anti-
immigrant sentiments much higher in Germany and France than in Nordic countries. The more 
immigrants, it seems, the more anti-immigrant feelings are exacerbated where one could expect 
(hope) that the importance of immigrant populations would reduce xenophobia (Table 30). 
 
Table 30. Attitudes towards immigration, 2004. 
 Immigrants make country a 
worse place to live* 
Allow no immigrants of 
different race/religion 
ethnic group from majority   
Finland 7.6 10.7 
Sweden 7.2 3.5 
Norway 13.1 6.6 
Iceland 2.5 8.5 
Denmark 9.8 10.3 
France 19.8 15.0 
Germany 17.1 15.5 
Source: European social survey. 
 
Discrimination of course is also objective, as migrants are offered or not the conditions of 
their social integration. In this respect also, most Nordic countries appear overall to be more 
hospitable to immigrants than France and Germany, while Italy ranks higher (Table 31). France 
would certainly be well-inspired to invest more in migrants’ welfare-enhancing public policies, 
even if the recent creation of the HALDE is a step forward (that accounts for France’s rank accord-
ing to the anti-discrimination indicator). 
 
Table 31. Migrant integration index, 2005. 
Rank (out of 32) Overall 
Labor 
market 
access 
Family 
reunion 
Long-term 
residence 
Political 
participation 
Access to 
nationa-
lity 
Anti-
discrimination 
 
1 Sweden 88 100 92 76 93 71 94 
5 Finland 67 70 68 65 81 44 75 
7 Italy 65 85 79 67 55 33 69 
8 Norway 64 70 66 72 86 39 54 
 EU-15 60 64 59 61 60 48 66 
11 France 55 50 45 48 52 54 81 
14 Germany 53 50 61 53 66 38 50 
21 Denmark 44 40 36 67 55 33 33 
 
Gap between top 
3 Nordic and 
France 18 30 30 23 35 -3 -7 
Source: Jan Niessen, Thomas Huddleston and Laura Citron, Migrant Integration Policy Index, Brussels,  
British Council and Migration Policy Group, September 2007. The Migrant Integration Policy. Index may 
be downloaded from www.integrationindex.eu 
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- Segregation 
 
Since Sweden is presented as the “best practice” country for migrants’ integration in the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index, we will finally compare Sweden with France on the chapter of 
segregation. 
  
Fitoussi, Laurent and Maurice (2004) have highlighted the fact that, in contemporary 
France, socio-spatial polarization bears witness to a long period of persistent unemployment 
and generates a dynamic of urban divergence. This has found a particularly clear expression in 
the creation and expansion of the French ZUS (zones urbaines sensibles – sensitive urban areas). 
Furthermore, the authors formulated the hypothesis that urban segregation had a multiplier ef-
fect on the hysteresis observed in the labor market, the key drivers of this “spatial hysteresis” 
being the establishment of a physical and social distance from employment and the develop-
ment of pronounced discrimination in the labor market. This dynamic of divergence grows 
steadily in time and space within a genuine system of urban segregation, whereby social in-
equalities in sensitive urban areas are perpetuated over time due to difficulties in education and 
training systems, while their geographical extension is caused by unequal access to housing, col-
lective facilities and inequalities in local public finances.  
 
The latest available figures (Table 32) largely confirm this conclusion, even if they show 
that, from 2002 to 2006, unemployment actually decreased more in the ZUS than in the rest of 
France, perhaps showing positive impact from the implementation of urban policies reforms 
(from 1990 to 1999, unemployment increased more in the ZUS than in the rest of France). What is 
more, the double penalty resulting from staying in a ZUS and being an immigrant is as strong as 
ever. Chart 10 illustrates how the ZUS aggravate French social trends. 
 
Table 32. ZUS and the rest of France. 
 ZUS Rest of France 
Success at the Baccalauréat S exam (June 2006) 84.4 89.1 
Success at the Brevet exam (2004-2005) 68.3 80.9 
Percentage of pupils lagging behind in 6ème grade (2005) 5.8 2.9 
Percentage of pupils lagging behind in 3ème grade (2005) 9.3 5.0 
Reduction in unemployment from 2002 to 2006 in Category 1  -14.0 -9.4 
Inactivity rate of 25-49 years old (2005) 21.0 10.7 
Inactivity rate overall (2005) 34.3 25.1 
Unemployment rate for 15-24 years old (2005) 44.9 22.2 
Unemployment overall (2005) 22.1 10.5 
Unemployment rate among non-immigrants (2005) 19.7 9.7 
Unemployment rate among immigrants from EU (2005) 9.6 8.5 
Unemployment rate among non-EU immigrants (2005) 31.7 21.5 
Income at the 1st decile in euros (2002) 6115 12266.5 
Income at the 5th decile in euros (2002) 9048.5 14329.5 
Interdecile gap (D9/D1) in 2002 2.0 1.3 
Low-income population perceiving a social allocation (2003-2004) 28.6 10.4 
Population declaring itself in bad health condition (2002-2003) 32.0 26.0 
     Source : Observatoire des Zones Urbaines Sensibles. 
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Chart 10. 
 
But Sweden, with a very different approach to integration policy, also has a problem of 
segregation. As noted in Andersonn (2007), “it is something of a paradox that, since the country 
declared itself multicultural in 1975, integration into the labour market has become much more 
problematic, immigrants’ political participation has dropped, and increasing proportions of es-
pecially newly arrived immigrants have concentrated in ‘immigrant-dense’ neighbourhoods.” 
“Furthermore, segregation increases the risk of racism and discrimination. The multicultural 
model seems more out of reach now than it was at the time of its breakthrough 30 years ago,” 
adds the author. Åsa (2006) also remarks that “during the 1990s, the residential segregation of 
immigrants increased in many Swedish cities.” 
 
Biterman and Franzén (2007) provide empirical evidence of segregation in large Swedish 
cities. Table 33 and 34 reproduce some of their results. 
 
Table 33. Segregation in Sweden. 
 Living in Greater 
Stockholm region 
Greater 
Göteberg 
Greater 
Malmö 
Whole 
Country 
Total population 1 830 600 769 900 528 300 8 940 800 
Of which born in 
Sweden (%) 
82 85 83 88 
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Table 34. Segregation in Sweden. 
  
Economic development 
 
  
Well-off 
 
 
Economically 
integrated 
slightly 
impoverished 
Poor Very poor 
Total 
Predominantly Swedish-
born population 
262 90 14 1 367 
Ethnically integrated, 
elements of visible minorities 
10 
 
 
 
32 
 
34 
 
1 
 
77 
 
Predominantly minorities 
 
– 
 
10 
 
25 
 
8 
 
43 
 
Almost exclusively visible 
minorities – 
 
 
– 
 
 
1 
 
 
13 
 
 
14 
 
 
E
th
n
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
 
Total 272 132 74 23 501 
Source : Danuta Biterman, Eva Franzén (2007), Table 6:3. Distribution of urban neighbourhoods in Greater 
Stockholm, Greater Göteborg and Greater Malmö by ethnic and economic types of development. 
 
How should the French model of integration take into account the Nordic experience? 
Resolute progress should be made in anti-discrimination policies, since discrimination exacer-
bates still further the phenomenon of urban segregation impacting, in particular, access to hous-
ing, work and training. It affects not only foreigners, but also French citizens of, or assumed to 
be of, foreign origin. 
 
But should France embrace multiculturalism of the Swedish type? The French model of 
integration is certainly in crisis, but it is possible that multiculturalism is simultaneously in crisis 
in Sweden. As noted by Lamont and Laurent (2006),3 in France, “the frustration and resentment 
expressed by French minorities is largely caused by the contradiction between a fantasized 
equality and real-life discrimination.” Yet, the French “republican model” is not to be altogether 
thrown overboard. The French model of integration has been neglecting the social conditions 
necessary to its success for too long. It now has to apparently contradict itself to be renewed, by 
acknowledging that where the initial conditions of access to society have deteriorated too far, 
greater equality must take over from strict legal neutrality.  
 
Epilogue: May 1968, models and systems 
 
It is usually when a social system is entering a severe crisis that it becomes a model for 
others. If this is so, Nordic countries should be worried about all the international attention they 
are getting. France itself was a “model” for the rest of the world in the late 1960s.  
 
How can the Nordic model be helpful in solving some of the major problems France is 
facing? We have tried to show in this paper that taking country size differences into account is a 
                                                
3“France shows its true colors” The Boston Globe, June 3, 2006, reprinted as “Identity: France shows its true 
colors,” in The International Herald Tribune, June 6, 2006.  
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first step in the right direction. The next one may be to realize that there is not so much a “Nor-
dic model” as a “Nordic method,”4 which allows implementing peacefully efficient reforms. 
While France can not import “ready to wear” institutional features, it should try to understand 
Nordic countries’ customized reform design. 
 
The fortieth anniversary of May 1968, the most important postwar civil event of French 
history, which started by way of youth revolt in universities but did not lead to a betterment of 
youth welfare or universities, now both a major weakness of the French model, is a good re-
minder that reform rhetoric often trumps reform action in France. France has the lowest figures 
for youth labor market integration not only compared to all Nordic countries, but also to conti-
nental ones (Table 35), this table being only of course the tip of the iceberg of the youth’s predi-
cament in France.5 
 
 
Table 35. Youth (15-24 years old) in the labor market 2006. 
 Unemployment  
rates 
Employment/population 
ratios 
Labor force 
participation rates 
Iceland 8.4 72.9 79.5 
Norway 8.6 53.1 58.1 
Sweden 21.3 44.0 56.0 
Finland 18.8 40.6 50.1 
Denmark 7.6 63.7 69.0 
France 23.9 25.3 33.2 
Germany 13.5 43.9 50.7 
Italy 21.6 25.5 32.5 
      Source: OECD. 
 
French universities should not as well be a motive of national pride, as illustrated by 
Table 36. 
 
Table 36. Top universities in 2007. 
 Ranking 
overall 
Top 100 Top 200 Top 300 Top 400 Top 500 
Sweden 7 4 4 9 10 11 
Denmark 12 1 3 4 4 4 
Norway 13 1 1 2 3 4 
Finland 14 1 1 1 3 5 
France 6 4 7 12 18 23 
Germany 4 6 14 22 36 41 
Source: Institute of Higher Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. 
 
There is much to learn from Nordic countries in those two respects. But the major limit of 
the Nordic template ultimately lies in the fact that a model’s coherence is idiosyncratic. France 
                                                
4Grejbine and Laurent (2008) make this point about Sweden.  
5For an analysis of French youth social itinerary since the 1960s, see Chauvel, Louis, 1998 [2e éd. 2002], Le 
destin des générations : structure sociale et cohortes en France au XXe siècle (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France); for a contemporary comparison between French and Danish youth, see C. Van de Velde, Devenir 
adulte. Sociologie comparée de la jeunesse en Europe (Paris : PUF), « Le Lien social », 2006. 
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chose to preserve solidarity in the face of globalization, as the importance (and quality) of its 
public services and social protection shows. Yet, this commitment only applies for a part of the 
French population. Furthermore, a high level of solidarity can only be sustained in terms of pub-
lic finance if income per capita grows rapidly and France can only increase its income per capita 
by expanding the scope of its exceptional but partly artificial productivity. Given France’s size, 
this implies both an ambitious industrial and research policy and a reactive macroeconomic 
management so that employment rates grow for all categories of workers. The scale of these 
policies is now European. In this regard, social and tax competition among European countries 
should not be viewed as a sustainable growth strategy, but as a dangerous illusion: a quick fix 
that risks jeopardizing decades of European integration.  
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